With the International Space Station nearing retirement, NASA issued a solicitation for commercial space stations in October. Meanwhile, SpaceX stopped accepting rideshare launch bookings for dates after the end of 2028. Together, the developments highlight a core challenge for commercial spaceflight: projects require substantial upfront capital, but there are few mechanisms to turn global demand into firm orders and construction financing.
For startups that rely on low-cost rideshare launches, tighter access to launch capacity could disrupt business plans. Nebex CEO Tejpaul Bhatia argues NASA could do more than increase its budget. Procurement arrangements that connect prospective customers, suppliers and financing earlier could reduce commercial stations’ and next-generation rockets’ dependence on a single government buyer or launch provider.
Launch alternatives are growing, but capacity remains unproven
SpaceX’s pause on rideshare bookings beyond 2028 leaves companies built around frequent, low-cost launches facing uncertainty. Alternatives are available, but their scale and readiness vary. Rocket Lab’s Electron offers dedicated launches for small satellites. ULA’s Vulcan and Blue Origin’s New Glenn are designed for larger payloads, but both rockets were grounded at the time: Vulcan had been down since February and New Glenn since April.
New competitors are also advancing. Isar Aerospace has secured a launch contract with Planet, while Stoke Space has raised $1 billion and is targeting its first launch in 2027. Rocket Lab expects its larger Neutron rocket to make its debut that year as well. India’s Skyroot has completed the launch of the first private orbital mission for its Vikram 1 rocket. Most of these options, however, have yet to demonstrate sustained capacity and reliability comparable with established providers.
SpaceX’s Starship completed its first orbital flight in September and could eventually add to overall launch capacity. It remains unclear whether that capacity will be available to companies that depend on third-party launch services. For startups, the question is not simply whether new rockets will fly, but when they can offer regular service at comparable cost.
Government spending is large, but commercial financing is limited
The problem is not a lack of government demand for space, Bhatia said. The Space Foundation put government spending on space at about $141 billion the previous year, with budgets still growing. The gap, he argues, is that many businesses branded as commercial space companies continue to rely on the U.S. government as their principal anchor customer, leaving taxpayers to shoulder much of the cost of building the market.
In September, NASA Administrator Jared Isaacman responded to a former NASA official’s call for more agency funding for crewed spacecraft, saying that not every problem or opportunity can simply be labeled “commercial.” Bhatia agrees NASA cannot fill every gap in the market. Even when demand exceeds supply, he said, a commercial market will not form automatically; procurement rules and market infrastructure are needed to connect buyers and providers.
Bhatia entered the space sector in 2021. Over the following four years, he helped arrange trips to the ISS for sovereign astronauts from Italy, Sweden, Turkey, India, Poland, Hungary, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. He also closed deals with Fortune 100 companies to send orbital computing, drug research and space manufacturing payloads into orbit. Bhatia says these projects generated $1 billion in new sovereign and commercial business without relying on U.S. government contracts. The experience informs his case for improving how public and private players structure deals and financing to broaden commercial space revenues.
NASA could connect suppliers, customer commitments and credit
NASA’s recent solicitation for an ISS replacement puts limits on bids that depend heavily on taxpayer funding or project long periods of negative cash flow, while placing value on commercial and sovereign customer revenue. But Bhatia says short bid timelines and stringent crewed-flight experience requirements can leave lead contractors reliant on traditional aerospace suppliers. They may have to buy hardware at higher cost upfront, then wait years for international and commercial customers to materialize.
Rather than simply increasing NASA’s budget, Bhatia proposes changes to procurement and project financing. First, NASA could streamline supplier reviews and bring suppliers from allied and partner countries into projects earlier, lowering the cost of hardware and services. Those companies and their governments could also become partners and customers for future stations, not just vendors.
Second, projects could prioritize binding, reciprocal commitments from partners to use the facilities, giving future stations a clearer demand base before they reach orbit. Third, NASA’s milestone payments are often concentrated after major technical achievements. Bhatia suggests the agency consider working with market infrastructure providers to finance early supplier costs against revenue from committed customers, reducing pressure on developers to draw down cash reserves or dilute equity.
The same approach could help aggregate launch demand for emerging rockets. Bringing global supplier discovery, customer commitments and credit channels into one framework could help lead contractors submit lower-cost bids, give international partners an earlier role in the orbital economy and reduce the burden on U.S. taxpayers. NASA’s solicitation criteria and procurement timetable will therefore shape not only who builds the next space station, but also whether commercial customers become part of its revenue base.